对衡阳保卫战评价的差异
根源在于衡量标准不同

【 在 cjohn (猴年马月) 的大作中提到: 】
: 把这个帖子（http://www.cchere.com/article/3772961）树展，就可以看到了。
: 还是把摘要贴一下：
: －－－
: ...................
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FROM 106.3.63.*

国民党三年就败给解放军，其实从抗战中就可以发现端倪。

【 在 simasinan (诸葛) 的大作中提到: 】
: 标  题: Re: 在西西河关于衡阳战役的讨论摘要
: 发信站: 水木社区 (Tue Aug 28 11:42:07 2012), 站内
:
:
:
: 有些人总是对国军要求较低，认为他们只要不溃散，就已经对得起国家人民了
:
: 至于投降当伪军，这也是可以原谅的
:
:
: 【 在 alarm (五毛五分五麻袋，来者不拒) 的大作中提到: 】
: : 对衡阳保卫战评价的差异
: : 根源在于衡量标准不同
:
: --
:
: ※ 来源:·水木社区 http://newsmth.net·[FROM: 221.194.177.*]
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FROM 221.219.70.*

【 在 alarm (五毛五分五麻袋，来者不拒) 的大作中提到: 】
: 按照国军的标准，衡阳保卫战是打得很不错的，堪称惊天地、泣鬼神；但是按
: 照二战期间其它主要参战国的标准，就很一般了。
: 至于方先觉投降后、所部被发表为“先和军”、方本人抛头露面配合日军的宣
: ...................

我想弄清楚的是，如果外围援军齐心协力，能不能打退日军的进攻并守住？西西河上的主流意见是很难，因为日军兵力比长沙战役增强很多，采用宽大正面大纵深的战法，援军一支支被打成渣。

我的想法是，第二次长沙之战日军不也是类似的战法，是快把74军打成渣了，可不还是没有攻下长沙吗。何况衡阳还有空军助阵。

总是感觉形势没有悲观的必败的地步。但我基本是个军盲，请各位军事大牛谈谈面对日军的大规模兵力，衡阳是否能守住，该怎样守？

有可能的话，请大牛们直接上西西河参与讨论，效果更好，谢谢啊。
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FROM 192.146.101.*

【 在 alarm (五毛五分五麻袋，来者不拒) 的大作中提到: 】
: 一、如果援军组织得力、第十军死战不降，是有可能守住衡阳的。当时日军也
: 已经极度困难，尤其是后勤，野战医院宛若阿鼻地狱，伤病员宁愿随队行动、
: 也不愿意进医院——随队行动尚有一线生机，进了医院就凶多吉少。因为后勤
: ...................

谢谢回复，跟我的判断基本吻合。有大牛的肯定，有了底气，呵呵。

不过，依照花生米的这样囤积粮饷、对付杂牌和共军的战略，美国是不愿意更多给他援助的。昨天晚上读的《Stilwell and the American Experience in China》提到在开罗会议刚开始的时候，罗斯福是极力想扶一把蒋介石，但蒋介石的狮子大开口让罗斯福很厌烦（到这个时候，美国政府中大多数人都反对继续把大量的美援倾注于中国战场，以维持中国的抗战局面，因为他们已经从史迪威和其他各个渠道得知蒋介石并不想打仗，罗斯福是支持蒋介石的少数派的头领）。开罗会议结束后，罗斯福和丘吉尔立刻北上德黑兰和斯大林开会，斯大林否决了英国人在欧洲周边打仗的主意，坚持要英美直接侵入欧洲大陆，同时很爽快地答应了德国投降之后，出兵东北。这让罗斯福觉得斯大林是他的得力马仔，起了抛弃蒋介石的念头。而且这时候太平洋战场美军步步前进，似乎不再需要维持中国的空军基地以进行对日本的大规模轰炸－－可以直接从太平洋上的岛屿进行。美军对日战略中对中国战场的依赖程度在开罗会议前后跌落了很多。

当时在开罗会议上，蒋介石坚持Y-Force前出缅甸的先决条件是英国开展海路攻势，拿下仰光，切断日本人的退路。但英国佬一贯地不配合使得罗斯福陷入两难，在口头上给了蒋介石一个commit，但并没有得到丘吉尔的允诺。等从德黑兰回来之后，由于斯大林答应出兵东北使得花生米重要性大大降低，加上由于要开辟法国的第二战场，英国人更要紧牙关不松口在缅甸打仗，使得罗斯福最后通知花生米仰光战役off，书里面说道，其实这也是罗斯福对中国战场的希望off掉了。

开罗会议前后，是美国援助中国力度的一个转折点（之后虽然还在支持，但属于惯性的范畴）。90个美械师的承诺，自此以后美国政府从上到下都没有什么人去认真对待了。
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FROM 192.146.101.*

【 在 alarm (五毛五分五麻袋，来者不拒) 的大作中提到: 】
: 关于美国对中国战场的态度，虽然在越岛攻势下、夺取了硫黄岛，以中国作为
: 基地轰炸日本本土的必要性降低了，但是中国依然是日本重兵占领的一个地方，
: 在美国的对日战略棋局上依然有不可替代的地位。加之从地缘政治角度考虑，
: ...................

我前面说的有些不太准确，还是抄书好了：

The military discussions occupied three days and the fate of the Burma offensive was darker at the end than at the the beginning. The plan drawn by SEAC for the naval and amphibious action that Chiang insisted on (because he believed it would draw off the Japanese from heavey reaction to the land offensive) provided for capture of the Andaman Islands off the Burma coast. Its code name was BUCCANEER. The land offensive proposed for the British called for establishment of a bridgehead over the Chindwin and an airborne landing at Indaw on the railway to Myitkyina without further specified objective. Large numbers of troops and landing craft were scheduled to ensure the guaranteed victory the Mountbatten believed the theater required.

Stilwell summarized both operations as "abortions". They did not go anywhere or lead anywhere. They would show activity, satisify Chiang's naval requirement and engage the enemy up to a point. Chiang was not told the actual objective of the Bay of Bengal operation, only that there would be one. Apart from leading nowhere, the main flaw of BUCCANEER was the disinclination of the British chiefs, especially Churchill, to undertake it, for reasons tangled in the dispute over the Second Front in Europe. Churchill did not want to do OVERLORD --- the cross-Channel attack --- either, preferring the peripheral approach through the Mediterranean aimed at the soft underbelly. He wanted to use the landing craft necessary for BUCCANEER for an attack on Rhodes with the object of bringing Turkey into the war. He always had on hand an option tht could be proposed to avoid another course of action he did not like. Marshall intensely disliked the Rhodes proposal which would "burn up our logistics right down the line" and detract from OVERLORD on which American sights were fixed. The American chiefs were determined to carry out BUCCANEER in order to fulfill the promise to Chiang Kai-shek and thus bring in the troops from Yunnan without whom Stilwell's campaign could not open the back door to China.

...

He (Chiang Kai-shek) kept insisting that simultaneously with the campaign in Burma, and regardless of conflicting logistics, deliveries over the Hump must be maintained at 10,000 tons a month, and he insisted on an increased number of transports to assure this. Marshall, who considered the transports already assigned to the Hump as harmful to operations in Europe, remined the Generalissimo in an angry outburst that these were American planes, personnel and materiel, that China must fight to reopen the Road if she wanted more materiel, and that there would be no further increase in transports: "There must be no misunderstanding about this."

...

In the afternoon Chiang and his generals came. "Terrible performance. They couldn't ask a quesiton. Brooke was insulting. I helped them out". (史迪威日记) When, in the presence of the three chiefs of state, the Chinese were asked questions about the Yunnan force which they could not answer, Stilwell replied for them.

...

Brooke, the type of Englishman who considered a foreigner something to be snubbed and if nonwhite to be stepped on, pressed the embarrassed Chinese further, asking for their view of the plan of campaign which had previously been given them to read. There ensued, according to his account, "the most ghastly silence," followed by the Chinese "whispering together in a state of excitement," after which a spokesman announced, "We wish to listen to your deliberations." As the first such meeting the Chinese had attended, one in an alien context and language and overwhelming in gold braid and brass, it was not an experience in which they could easily shine.

...

Stilwell spent the evening helping the Chinese to prepare questions for the next day and briefing Madame for a lunch meeting she was to have with Marshall. He wrote out notes for her to use in arguing the case for American divisions. Before the afternoon meeting, the Generalissimo again changed his mind twice about attending; he came but asked Stilwell to present his views. Understandably dissatisfied with the short objectives of the SEAC campaign, he vacillated about committing the Y-force on this basis, while at the same time insisting on increasing ATC deliveries.

In this impasse Roosevelt sent Mountbatten, the charmer, to try to explain realities to Chiang and secure his promise to cross the Salween;

...

Mountbatten worked hard to convice the Generalissmo that extra planes were simply not available. Chiang maintained a bland insistence on 535 transports. "The President will refuse me nothing," he told Mountbatten. "Anything I ask, he will do." In a last effort Mountbatten said that even if that many planes could be found, it would be impossible to meet the Generalissimo's demands for the Hump and and the same time mount the airborne assault on Mandalay that he wanted before the monsoon. At this point a prolonged colloquy ensued between Chiang and his wife utnil, responding to the query in Mountbatten's raised eyebrows, Madame turned to him and said, "Believe it or not, he does not know about the monsoon."

接下来是史迪威和总统讨价还价，要求派遣美国陆军部队到缅甸，罗斯福不答应。

He (The President) did, however, agree, without a definite target date, to equip the 90 divisions, more from a desire to give Chiang Kai-shek something to show for his journey than from belief in a reformed Chinese Army. Stilwell considered this one of the "sure" commitments of Cairo. The Chinese, without ever producing 90 consolidated divisiions (整编师), were to pursue it as a commitment for years.

...

Two developments at Tehran crystallized the results of Cairo. These were Stalin's insistence on OVERLORD plus ANVIL (the coordinated landing in southern France) as soon as possible and his reiteration of the statement made earlier to Harriman and Hull at Moscow in October, that Russia join the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated. Although Churchill fought hard for Rhodes and Turkey, American and Russian support of OVERLORD carried the day. This promptly supplied Churchill with the excuse to cancel BUCCANEER and use its landing craft for southern France. He refused positively to do both, especially since, in his view, the Russian promise to enter the war against Japan eliminated the need for a campaign in China or a major effort to support China. BUCCANEER would be wasted. The prospect of Russia's entry, he maintained, changed everything.

...

Casually Stalin contributed his bit to the decline. When Roosevelt told him about the Burma offensive and the role of the Yunnan force he remarked that the fighting capacity of the Chinese troops was low owing to "poor leadership". He made no objections to the proposed Declaration on the return of China's territories and future independence for Korea, merely commenting that "the Chinese must be made to fight which thus far they not done".

... (回到开罗，英美接着就BUCANNER计划扯皮，美国人力图促成，英国人就是拖着不干，找各种各样的后勤方面的借口)

On Decemember 5 Roosevelt yielded tin a lacanic three-word message to Churchill, "BUCANEER is off." Thus ended the two weeks of Cairo-Tehran. In those two weeks China moved into the shadow. At the beginning Roosevelt was dertermined to make the occasion a Chinese success; ad the end he sacrificed Chiang Kai-shek to Stalin. He had found a new partner at the dance. His three words marked a turning point, though not then rocognized, in relations with China.

泥马，手敲累了，就这么些吧，也差不多了。
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FROM 96.29.229.*