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标 题: 日本佛教与政治的关系简谈 (二) 佛教寺院卷入政治的原因 (一稿)(转自
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发信站: BBS 水木清华站 (Fri May 28 04:03:05 2004), 站内
【以下文章转自 KGB 的BLOG:★人类文明史★上最好Blog!!!!!!】
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http://www.smth.edu.cn/pc/pccon.php?id=210&nid=38174&s=all 日本佛教与政治的关系简谈 (二) 佛教寺院卷入政治的原因 (一稿)
Several reasons
I) A tradition of political activism
The fact that there has been an almost secular tradition within
Japanese Buddhist institutions which showed great interest in secular affairs
such as economy and politics. This tradition had been passed down from the
early period downwards, manifested to its utmost degree in the mediaeval
Japan. Priesthood in many temples were hereditary, and the tradition had been
transmitted through a family line. Active social and political engagement
became in implicit consensus and duty. The only difference between many monks
and politicians (or feudal lords and samurai, precisely), were that they were
born into a priest family.
Whether the priesthood were hereditary or not is of less importance then we
may assume. The important thing is that Japanese Buddhism was so much
embedded with practical affairs that it was institutionally political. From a
historicised Japanese perspective it is of no surprise because this has been
the tradition: a priest has his religious role, and political role as well.
Even some most other-worldliness sect of Buddhism, such as Zen (禅宗)
Buddhism, became complexly entangled with politics, such as Zen Buddhism,
effectively the officially sponsored sect under the Kamakura bakufu (幕府).
2) The differentiation of religious teachings, doctrines and religious
institutions.
Religious teachings are normally sets of teachings of value references and
ideology; Religious institutions are religious organisations that organise
and direct religious affairs of the religion, such as organising religious
rites, establishing temples, sending missionaries and attracting new
followers, training and recruiting clerics, expanding the influence of the
religion and undertaking activities which are in modern sense about “public
relationships”. Thus religious institutions have their own agenda and set of
objectives; they were in their own sense utility-maximising agents.
Priests in these religious institutions could also have their own interests
and agenda. They may choose to maximise their own reputation, wealth,
political and social influence and so forth, not always in the line with the
teachings of the religion. Not all monks are necessarily fanatic religious
devotees; they could be blatant cynics acted upon in the name of religion.
This is exactly the corruption within a religious institution.
All in all, religious institutions could undertake activities, which
considerably departed from the teachings and values of its religion. This has
been a constant phenomenon through the history of human civilisation and one
should not be surprised by it.
3) Vested interests
For the established Japanese temples in mediaeval time, there were simply too
many of vested interests: for example, the revenue you gain from your shōen
(i.e. landholdings) and non-liability to government taxations; your privilege
that criminal activities committed in your territory will be persecuted by
agents no other than yourself; other economic resources you control, such as
those from the jinaimachi; military power which could protect your status and
interest and help you to expand. Only active political engagement could
possibly ensure that these vested interests were protected, let alone
advanced. Refraining from protecting these vested interests were in itself
constituting a cost to the temple and its sect, since this means that
influence of your temple/sect relative to other competing temples and sects
will decline, and this is in the long-run unsustainable and non-conducive to
development of your temple. Therefore, there was a competitive environment in
which all temples strived to do well in the political and economic realm to
maintain their establishment and avoid to be left behind.
The temptation of these vested interests were so great, that along with a
strong embedded political tradition which could help to rationalise and
justify political engagement (against Buddhist teachings), entailed that all
Buddhist temples would participate politics actively.
4) Moral decadency and moral hazard
In the mediaeval period, so many priests were actually morally corrupt: they
had no moral superiority to the ordinary people, only that they could have
the status of being a priest and acted in the name of religion with a
pretence. Moral decadency, moral degeneration, corruption, and blatant abuse
of power, rendered Japanese Buddhism lost its status of spiritual centre and
moral foundation of Japanese society (this was later officially gave away to
Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism (朱熹新儒家)under the Tokugawa (徳川) bakufu. It
could be said that Japanese Buddhism had digged their own tomb and destroyed
upon themselves.
One reason to explain moral decadency is the idea of “moral hazard”. It is
interesting to see the reason why Honganji (prime temple of Jōdo Shin-Shū)
was so political. One reason is due to the very teaching of Pure Land
Buddhism: followers were to read Amida Buddha’s name on the daily basis, and
would be salved by doing this very act; for the Japanese monks and many
ordinary believers these were arguably the only religious practices necessary
to ensure nirvana in afterlife: few other moral constraints in conduct were
imposed. Thus Japanese monks could marry, consume meat, accumulate wealth and
occasionally took actions which were completely discouraged or forbidden by
social norms. This is a typical example of moral hazard due to an easy
guarantee of happiness in afterlife by simplistic practice – an easy
permission to the Pure Land became a permission of abuse of power and moral
position in this life. For a Chinese perspective, this version of Buddhism is
absolutely distorted and unjustified.
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