【 在 alarm (五毛五分五麻袋，来者不拒) 的大作中提到: 】
: 关于美国对中国战场的态度，虽然在越岛攻势下、夺取了硫黄岛，以中国作为
: 基地轰炸日本本土的必要性降低了，但是中国依然是日本重兵占领的一个地方，
: 在美国的对日战略棋局上依然有不可替代的地位。加之从地缘政治角度考虑，
: ...................
我前面说的有些不太准确，还是抄书好了：
The military discussions occupied three days and the fate of the Burma offensive was darker at the end than at the the beginning. The plan drawn by SEAC for the naval and amphibious action that Chiang insisted on (because he believed it would draw off the Japanese from heavey reaction to the land offensive) provided for capture of the Andaman Islands off the Burma coast. Its code name was BUCCANEER. The land offensive proposed for the British called for establishment of a bridgehead over the Chindwin and an airborne landing at Indaw on the railway to Myitkyina without further specified objective. Large numbers of troops and landing craft were scheduled to ensure the guaranteed victory the Mountbatten believed the theater required.
Stilwell summarized both operations as "abortions". They did not go anywhere or lead anywhere. They would show activity, satisify Chiang's naval requirement and engage the enemy up to a point. Chiang was not told the actual objective of the Bay of Bengal operation, only that there would be one. Apart from leading nowhere, the main flaw of BUCCANEER was the disinclination of the British chiefs, especially Churchill, to undertake it, for reasons tangled in the dispute over the Second Front in Europe. Churchill did not want to do OVERLORD --- the cross-Channel attack --- either, preferring the peripheral approach through the Mediterranean aimed at the soft underbelly. He wanted to use the landing craft necessary for BUCCANEER for an attack on Rhodes with the object of bringing Turkey into the war. He always had on hand an option tht could be proposed to avoid another course of action he did not like. Marshall intensely disliked the Rhodes proposal which would "burn up our logistics right down the line" and detract from OVERLORD on which American sights were fixed. The American chiefs were determined to carry out BUCCANEER in order to fulfill the promise to Chiang Kai-shek and thus bring in the troops from Yunnan without whom Stilwell's campaign could not open the back door to China.
...
He (Chiang Kai-shek) kept insisting that simultaneously with the campaign in Burma, and regardless of conflicting logistics, deliveries over the Hump must be maintained at 10,000 tons a month, and he insisted on an increased number of transports to assure this. Marshall, who considered the transports already assigned to the Hump as harmful to operations in Europe, remined the Generalissimo in an angry outburst that these were American planes, personnel and materiel, that China must fight to reopen the Road if she wanted more materiel, and that there would be no further increase in transports: "There must be no misunderstanding about this."
...
In the afternoon Chiang and his generals came. "Terrible performance. They couldn't ask a quesiton. Brooke was insulting. I helped them out". (史迪威日记) When, in the presence of the three chiefs of state, the Chinese were asked questions about the Yunnan force which they could not answer, Stilwell replied for them.
...
Brooke, the type of Englishman who considered a foreigner something to be snubbed and if nonwhite to be stepped on, pressed the embarrassed Chinese further, asking for their view of the plan of campaign which had previously been given them to read. There ensued, according to his account, "the most ghastly silence," followed by the Chinese "whispering together in a state of excitement," after which a spokesman announced, "We wish to listen to your deliberations." As the first such meeting the Chinese had attended, one in an alien context and language and overwhelming in gold braid and brass, it was not an experience in which they could easily shine.
...
Stilwell spent the evening helping the Chinese to prepare questions for the next day and briefing Madame for a lunch meeting she was to have with Marshall. He wrote out notes for her to use in arguing the case for American divisions. Before the afternoon meeting, the Generalissimo again changed his mind twice about attending; he came but asked Stilwell to present his views. Understandably dissatisfied with the short objectives of the SEAC campaign, he vacillated about committing the Y-force on this basis, while at the same time insisting on increasing ATC deliveries.
In this impasse Roosevelt sent Mountbatten, the charmer, to try to explain realities to Chiang and secure his promise to cross the Salween;
...
Mountbatten worked hard to convice the Generalissmo that extra planes were simply not available. Chiang maintained a bland insistence on 535 transports. "The President will refuse me nothing," he told Mountbatten. "Anything I ask, he will do." In a last effort Mountbatten said that even if that many planes could be found, it would be impossible to meet the Generalissimo's demands for the Hump and and the same time mount the airborne assault on Mandalay that he wanted before the monsoon. At this point a prolonged colloquy ensued between Chiang and his wife utnil, responding to the query in Mountbatten's raised eyebrows, Madame turned to him and said, "Believe it or not, he does not know about the monsoon."
接下来是史迪威和总统讨价还价，要求派遣美国陆军部队到缅甸，罗斯福不答应。
He (The President) did, however, agree, without a definite target date, to equip the 90 divisions, more from a desire to give Chiang Kai-shek something to show for his journey than from belief in a reformed Chinese Army. Stilwell considered this one of the "sure" commitments of Cairo. The Chinese, without ever producing 90 consolidated divisiions (整编师), were to pursue it as a commitment for years.
...
Two developments at Tehran crystallized the results of Cairo. These were Stalin's insistence on OVERLORD plus ANVIL (the coordinated landing in southern France) as soon as possible and his reiteration of the statement made earlier to Harriman and Hull at Moscow in October, that Russia join the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated. Although Churchill fought hard for Rhodes and Turkey, American and Russian support of OVERLORD carried the day. This promptly supplied Churchill with the excuse to cancel BUCCANEER and use its landing craft for southern France. He refused positively to do both, especially since, in his view, the Russian promise to enter the war against Japan eliminated the need for a campaign in China or a major effort to support China. BUCCANEER would be wasted. The prospect of Russia's entry, he maintained, changed everything.
...
Casually Stalin contributed his bit to the decline. When Roosevelt told him about the Burma offensive and the role of the Yunnan force he remarked that the fighting capacity of the Chinese troops was low owing to "poor leadership". He made no objections to the proposed Declaration on the return of China's territories and future independence for Korea, merely commenting that "the Chinese must be made to fight which thus far they not done".
... (回到开罗，英美接着就BUCANNER计划扯皮，美国人力图促成，英国人就是拖着不干，找各种各样的后勤方面的借口)
On Decemember 5 Roosevelt yielded tin a lacanic three-word message to Churchill, "BUCANEER is off." Thus ended the two weeks of Cairo-Tehran. In those two weeks China moved into the shadow. At the beginning Roosevelt was dertermined to make the occasion a Chinese success; ad the end he sacrificed Chiang Kai-shek to Stalin. He had found a new partner at the dance. His three words marked a turning point, though not then rocognized, in relations with China.
泥马，手敲累了，就这么些吧，也差不多了。
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